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We present and analyze a quantum key distribution protocol based on sending entangled N-qubit
states instead of single-qubit ones as in the trail-blazing scheme by Bennett and Brassard (BB84).
Since the qubits are sent and acknowledged individually, an eavesdropper is limited to accessing
them one by one. In an intercept-resend attack, this fundamental restriction allows one to make the
eavesdropper’s information on the transmitted key vanish if even one of the qubits is not intercepted.
The implied upper bound 1/(2N) for Eve’s information is further shown not to be the lowest, as
the information can be reduced to less than 30% of that in BB84 in the case N = 2. In general, the
protocol is at least as secure as BB84.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 42.50.Dv
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum information science [1] has emerged to an-
swer the question: “What additional power and func-
tionality can be gained by processing and transmitting
information encoded in physical systems that exhibit
uniquely quantum mechanical behavior?” Anticipated fu-
ture quantum technologies include: quantum computing
[1, 2], which promises exponential speed-up for particu-
lar computational tasks; quantum metrology [3], which
allows the fundamental precision limit to be reached; and
quantum lithography [4], which could enable fabrication
of devices with features much smaller than the wave-
length of light. The most striking quantum technologies
that have already reached commercial realization are in
the area of quantum communication.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers secure com-
munication based on the fundamental laws of physics—
namely, that measurement of a quantum system being
used to transmit information must necessarily disturb
that system, and that this disturbance is detectable [5].
The first QKD scheme was proposed by Bennett and
Brassard in 1984 (BB84) and is based on generating a
cryptographic secret key between two distant parties, Al-
ice and Bob, by sending a random bit string encoded and
measured in one of two randomly chosen mutually unbi-
ased bases of a single qubit [6]. Photons are the logical
choice for transmitting quantum information and were
used in the first experimental realization of BB84 [7].
Since then there have been several important theoretical
improvements and experimental demonstrations of BB84
and other QKD protocols [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16],
which have culminated in commercial QKD systems. A
major challenge facing future practical quantum net-
works is to increase the rate at which the secure key
is generated. Most efforts in this direction are focused
on improving the underpinning technology [5]. Here we
propose an alternative approach based on improving the
underlying QKD protocol, which has been inspired by
recent developments in optical quantum computing [17].
The ability to reliably entangle photons is a major
goal of quantum information processing [17] and quan-
tum communication. Recent demonstrations of strong
coupling between semiconductor quantum dots and pho-
tonic crystal cavities has been reported [18, 19, 20]. The
generation and transfer of photons on a photonic crystal
chip has been demonstrated [21], together with entan-
gling photonic logic gates all in fibre [22], and in waveg-
uides on silicon chips [23]. The breakthrough proposal
based on measurement induced nonlinearities [24], capa-
ble of entangling photons for optical quantum computing,
was followed by important demonstrations of entangling
logic gates [25, 26, 27]. Recently, attention has focused on
generating entangled states of many photons, and it was
shown that atom-cavity systems can be used to generate
an arbitrary entangled state of N photons [28]. Thus the
technology for performing an entangling transformation
on several photons is now within sight.
Here we present a novel QKD protocol whose security
is lower-bounded by BB84. The insight of the proco-
tol relies on Alice entangling groups of qubits prior to
their one-by-one transmission. Because successive qubits
in each group are transmitted only after confirmation of
reception by Bob, an eavesdropper only has access to
the transmitted information one qubit at a time. The
eavesdropper is thus unable to perfectly undo the entan-
gling transformation even if aware of it. Qubits from
different entangled groups can be sent interleaved to
keep the quantum channel utilization high. We present
the maximal mutual information on the established key
2provided by any intercept-resend (IR) attack, and also
the corresponding induced disturbance, quantified by the
quantum bit error rate (QBER), for several entangling
transformations. We show that only small groups of
qubits need to be entangled for substantial gains: Uti-
lizing two-qubit entanglement, it is possible to signifi-
cantly reduce an eavesdropper’s maximal information on
the key, e.g., to less than 30% of that in BB84 for a
fixed QBER ≤ 25%. Furthermore, another multi-qubit
entangling transformation reduces the information gain
to zero in the case where the IR attacker intercepts all
but one of the qubits, which is shown to restrict the max-
imal information gain to 1/(2N). Finally, we present a
rough estimate of the key generation rate for the optimal
two-qubit protocol.
II. THE PROTOCOL
In our protocol, the initiator, Alice, generates a num-
ber of random bits, handled in groups of N . Each group
is an outcome of the random variable A = A1A2 · · ·AN
composed of the binary random variables Ai, for which
the probabilities are p(Ai = 0) = p(Ai = 1) =
1
2 ,
i = 1, . . . , N . Let the bit string a = a1a2 · · ·aN denote
the outcome of A. These bits form Alice’s raw key.
Alice uses a public quantum channel to transmit the
raw key to the recipient, Bob. The basis of each qubit
is random, being the eigenbasis of the Pauli matrix σz,
{|0〉, |1〉} or that of σx, {|+〉 = (|0〉+|1〉)/
√
2, |−〉 = (|0〉−
|1〉)/√2} with equal probability. Let α = α1α2 · · ·αN ,
with each αi ∈ {z, x}, denote Alice’s basis choices for an
N -bit group.
Before transmission, Alice applies a fixed N -qubit gate
UN , declared in public, to each group {|ai;αi〉}Ni=1. Thus
the qubits are, in general, entangled. She then sends
the qubits one by one to Bob, always waiting for Bob to
acknowledge each qubit on a public authenticated clas-
sical channel before sending the next one. This wait-
ing does not decrease the transmission rate: Individual
qubits from different groups can be sent interleaved. Bob
waits for N qubits to accumulate, and applies U †N to the
group. He projectively measures each qubit in the σz
or σx eigenbasis, chosen at random, and obtains his raw
key, consisting of the measurement results bi ∈ {0, 1}.
Figure 1 shows the protocol as a quantum circuit for the
N qubits. The quantum non-demolition (QND) mea-
surements needed for Bob to detect the reception of each
qubit are not shown. The QND measurements can be
performed with high fidelity, as is demonstrated, for in-
stance, in Ref. [29].
After the quantum transmission, Alice and Bob com-
pare their basis choices over the classical channel, and
discard the raw-key bits for which their bases did not co-
incide. Note that the entire N -bit group need not be dis-
carded, only the individual incompatible results. The re-
maining bits form the participants’ sifted keys which may
still contain differences due to noise or eavesdropping on
FIG. 1: Quantum circuit for the proposed protocol with the
intercept-resend attack. The circuit is repeated until a large
enough number of bits has been transmitted. The required
classical communication is not shown. Semicircles represent
projective measurements. Gate UN is an N-qubit entangler
announced in public. Gate R(β, γ) rotates a qubit by the
angles γ and β with respect to z and y axes, respectively.
Each ai, ei, and bi is a binary variable representing a bit in
Alice’s, Eve’s, and Bob’s raw key, respectively.
the quantum channel. Based on these differences, Alice
and Bob estimate the QBER, defined formally in Sec. III.
If the observed QBER is less than 15%, errors can be
corrected by a classical error correction (EC) procedure,
e.g., by one described in Ref. [30]. If eavesdropping is
suspected, Alice and Bob employ privacy amplification
which shortens the key and reduces any eavesdropper’s
information on it to an arbitrarily low value. For QBER’s
in the range 15-25%, less efficient quantum privacy am-
plification or classical advantage distillation techniques
can be used to arrive at a secure and error-free key [5].
III. ANALYSIS
First, we point out that our protocol cannot be less se-
cure than BB84, even if Eve is allowed any attack strat-
egy. Giving Eve full control of the gates UN and U
†
N
shown in Fig. 1 reduces the protocol to BB84 facing a
coherent attack. Thus, the proofs of security for BB84
with coherent attacks allowed (Ref. [31] and references
therein) also apply to our protocol, and Alice and Bob
can ensure the secrecy of the generated key in our proto-
col, as well.
We continue our more refined analysis by studying the
protocol under the IR attack. Potentially more efficient,
e.g., cloning, attacks are to be studied in future work. In
all attacks, the goal of the attacker is to obtain a copy of
the sifted key for a minimal increase in the QBER, which
is the only indicator of careful eavesdropping to Alice and
Bob. In BB84, the IR attack is succinctly described as
the eavesdropper, Eve, measuring the transmitted qubits
in z or x basis and resending the obtained results to Bob.
Independent of Eve’s choice of basis, she obtains on av-
erage at most 0.5 bits of information on each bit of the
sifted key, and induces an average QBER of at least 25%
[6]. A slightly better strategy for Eve is to clone each
3qubit imperfectly and measure the clone state [32]. The
more information Eve extracts on the key, the larger the
induced error rate is. Eve can also choose to interfere only
with a fraction ξ ∈ [0, 1] of the transmitted qubits. Eve’s
maximal information as a function of QBER is shown in
Fig. 2 for these attacks.
FIG. 2: Eve’s information per bit on Alice’s sifted key as a
function of the observed QBER for BB84 with cloning and
intercept-resend (IR) attacks (dashed lines), and for our pro-
tocol using U2 = C
`
pi
32
, 3pi
8
, pi
32
´
with the corresponding op-
timal IR attack (solid line). The arrow shows the effect of
engaging U2 while keeping the fraction of intercepted qubits
ξ = 0.8 constant.
In our protocol, Eve’s choice of basis has a signifi-
cant impact on her information and the induced QBER.
Hence, we allow Eve to measure each qubit in any ba-
sis. This is equivalent to allowing Eve arbitrary single-
qubit gates, and measurements in the z basis. For the
group of N qubits, Eve’s measurement results are the
outcomes e = e1e2 · · · eN of the random variable E, with
each ei ∈ {0, 1}.
Once Eve has measured a qubit, the result ei rep-
resents her best guess on Alice’s corresponding key
bit. Therefore, to minimize the QBER, she constructs
the state |ei; z〉 and then undoes the previously ap-
plied single-qubit gate before sending the qubit to Bob.
Any single-qubit gate can be written as three succes-
sive rotations about the Bloch-sphere axes y and z,
Rz(ϕ)Ry(β)Rz(γ)e
iφ. Since Eve measures in the z ba-
sis, the final rotation Rz(ϕ) has no effect on the result.
The global phase φ is irrelevant as well. Eve’s attack is
thus parametrized by the single-qubit gate rotation an-
gles {(β1, γ1), . . . , (βN , γN )}.
The information Eve gains on the key is quantified by
the mutual information of the random variables A and
E, defined as [1]
I(A,E) =
1
N
[H(A) +H(E)−H(A,E)], (1)
where H(·) denotes the Shannon entropy and H(·, ·)
the joint entropy. The factor 1
N
ensures that Eq. (1)
yields the mutual information per bit, since A and E
are both N -bit entities. The entropies must be averaged
over Alice’s choice of bases α which Eve eventually
finds out. Thus, H(A,E) = 1
2N
∑
αHα(A,E) =
− 12N
∑
α,a,e p(a, e|α) log2 p(a, e|α), and H(E) =
1
2N
∑
αHα(E) = − 12N
∑
α,e p(e|α) log2 p(e|α), where
the probabilities are conditioned on α. The entropy
H(A) = N .
The QBER is defined as the average probability of a
bit flip in the sifted key. For each individual qubit j =
1, . . . , N it is
QBERj =
1
4
x∑
αj=z
1∑
aj=0
p(Bj = a¯j |Aj = aj;αj),
where Bj is the random variable giving Bob’s measure-
ment result bj of jth qubit, and the bar denotes the log-
ical not operation. The QBER used in the following
analysis is the average of the QBER’s of the N qubits.
For Alice and Bob to accept the sifted key for post-
processing, the fraction of eavesdropped qubits ξ must
be such that QBER ≤ 0.25. Typically, they set a suit-
able threshold value for acceptance [5] in this regime,
where the information gain of the eavesdropper is linear
with respect to QBER in the IR attack. Therefore, Eve’s
maximal information for a given QBER is determined by
the maximum of the ratio I(A,E)/QBER.
The final bit rate Rnet is an important measure of effi-
ciency for a QKD protocol. This is the rate at which Alice
and Bob accumulate shared secret key bits, which contain
no errors, and on which Eve’s information is negligible,
i.e., below a known bound controlled by Alice and Bob.
Since the transformations UN and U
†
N provide no new
capabilities for Eve under the coherent attack model for
BB84, the final bit rate of our protocol cannot be lower
than in BB84, with an ideal quantum channel. However,
innocent noise in the quantum channel may change this
setting.
Let us present a recursive construction for the gate
UN which bounds the information of an IR attacker to
at most 1/(2N) for any QBER, a proof of which is given
in the Appendix. We denote this gate by U⋆N . The gate
has two equivalent versions of different parity: U⋆N,even
and U⋆N,odd, either one can be used as U
⋆
N . We de-
fine U⋆1,even = I1, the one-qubit identity operation, and
U⋆1,odd = σy . The unitary (N + 1)-qubit gate is obtained
with the following rule:
U⋆N+1 =
1√
2
[
I1 ⊗ U⋆N ± iσy ⊗
(
PNU
⋆
N
)]
, (2)
where PN = σy ⊗ I⊗N−11 if N ≥ 2 and P1 = σy . At each
step, either of the two signs can be chosen.
The fact that, with gate U⋆N , Eve cannot miss even a
single qubit unless she is content with zero information
gain also protects the key distribution against photon-
number splitting (PNS) attacks [33]. If the probability
of an unwanted multi-photon pulse is ε and events are
independent, the probability that Eve gains any infor-
mation decreases at least as εN .
4In what follows, we study the case N = 2 in
more detail. Arbitrary two-qubit gates have 16 de-
grees of freedom, several of which have no effect on
Eve’s maximal information. First fixing the global
phase of the gate and then following the treat-
ment in Ref. [34], we obtain U2 = (k2,1 ⊗ k2,2) ×
exp
[
i
2 (c1 σx ⊗ σx + c2 σy ⊗ σy + c3 σz ⊗ σz)
] × (k1,1 ⊗
k1,2), where kj,l are one-qubit gates and the middle
gate, C(c), has parameters c = (c1, c2, c3) with each
cj ∈ [0, 2π]. The local operation k2,1 ⊗ k2,2 can be di-
rectly undone by Eve, and is thus of no use to Alice and
Bob. Hence, the interesting two-qubit gates are of the
form C(c)(k1,1 ⊗ k1,2). To simplify the calculations, we
set k1,1 = k1,2. Removing this restriction can only im-
prove the results presented in Sec. IV.
IV. RESULTS
Figure 3 shows Eve’s mutual information on Alice’s
sifted key in the case N = 2, for an IR attack carried out
using the σz eigenbasis. The plot is obtained by a uniform
sweep over the parameters c ∈ [0, 2π]×3, over which Alice
can optimize the protocol. In the upper set of points, Eve
always measures both entangled qubits, and in the lower
set only one of them. It makes no difference which qubit
is measured, since here the gate U2 is symmetric with
respect to the two entangled qubits.
FIG. 3: Eve’s mutual information on Alice’s sifted key as a
function of the induced QBER for different gates U2 = C(c).
Eve uses the IR attack and measures in the σz eigenbasis.
The red dots (blue crosses) corresponds to Eve measuring
both (only one) of the two entangled qubits, in which case
Eve’s maximal mutual information is between 0.5 and 0.125
(0.25 and 0).
The topmost point in each set corresponds to U2 being
the two-qubit identity operation, with which our proto-
col reduces to BB84. At the undermost points of the two
sets, U2 = C
(
0, pi2 , 0
)
= U⋆2 = (I1 ⊗ I1 + iσy ⊗ σy) /
√
2.
As c2 increases from 0 to
pi
2 , the protocol continuously
shifts from BB84 to the U⋆2 -enhanced protocol. Eve
achieves the maximal information 12N = 0.25 by changing
one of her measurement bases from σz to σy .
FIG. 4: Eve’s mutual information on Alice’s sifted key as
a function of the induced QBER sampled over all possible
measurement bases for Eve. The entangling gate is fixed to
U2 = C(c
∗), where c∗ =
`
pi
32
, 3pi
8
, pi
32
´
. The red dots (blue
crosses) correspond to Eve measuring both (only one) of the
two entangled qubits, in which case Eve’s maximal mutual
information is between 0 and 0.2237 (0 and 0.0284).
Next, we show how to improve on the 1/(2N) bound
in the case N = 2. We allow Eve to use any measure-
ment bases. Thus, the task of finding the optimal C(c)
becomes a twofold optimization problem: Alice and Bob
wish to minimize the maximal information Eve can ob-
tain for a given QBER. We are thus interested in find-
ing the value mincmax{β1,γ1,β2,γ2} [I(A,E)/QBER] and
the optimizing parameter values. We perform the opti-
mization with the simplex search method [35]. One of
the optimal choices of parameters for Alice and Bob is
c
∗ =
(
pi
32 ,
3pi
8 ,
pi
32
)
, which leads to I(A,E) ≈ 0.2237 and
QBER = 0.375 for ξ = 1. Given U2 = C(c
∗), an opti-
mal choice for Eve is (β1, γ1, β2, γ2) =
(
pi
8 , 0,
pi
2 ,
pi
2
)
. Eve’s
maximal information as a function of the QBER is shown
as the solid line in Fig. 2. For a fixed QBER ≤ 25%, Eve’s
information drops to less than 30% of that in BB84.
Figure 4 elaborates on the consequences of Eve’s
choices given U2 = C(c
∗). In the upper (lower) set of
points, Eve measures both (only one) of the qubits in dif-
ferent bases. The plot is generated by a uniform sweep
over (β1, γ1, β2, γ2) ∈ [0, 2π]×4. Alice’s gate is fixed to
C(c∗) which, unlike U⋆2 , is observed not to guarantee
zero but still less than 0.03 bits of information leakage
for one-qubit interceptions.
Let us present an approximate comparison between our
protocol and BB84 in terms of the final bit rate. Follow-
ing Ref. [36], we assume that during error correction Alice
and Bob must exchange
nHbin(q) = n[−q log2 q − (1 − q) log2(1 − q)] (3)
bits, where n is the length of the key material, and q the
QBER. We further make the safe assumption that this is
the information, in bits, that is leaked to Eve. In BB84,
5Eve’s information per bit after EC is
IBB84EC (q) = 2q +Hbin(q). (4)
Let the optimal N = 2 setting represent our protocol,
where Eve’s information after EC is
I
(2)
EC(q) = sδq +Hbin(δq), (5)
where s = 0.5965 is the slope of the I(A,E) curve shown
in Fig. 2. The observed QBER is denoted by δq, so that
δ is the factor by which the use of U2 = C(c
∗) changes
the QBER. The absolute key rate depends heavily on the
practical implementation of the protocol, and we there-
fore use the relative key rate r = Rnet/Rsift, where Rsift
is the rate at which sifted key bits are generated. We
have [5]
r(q) = I(A,B)− I(A,E)
= 1−Hbin(q)− I(A,E)
= 1− IEC(q) (6)
for both protocols.
In the following, we fix the QBER to q = 6%, a typical
value in a practical realization [37, 38, 39, 40]. Then, the
relative key rate is rBB84 = 0.553 in BB84. The relative
key rate for our two-qubit protocol is shown in Fig. 5
together with a protocol, for which s = 0. For example
at δ = 1 for both protocols, the gain of the two-qubit
protocol over BB84 is 70% of that of the protocol with
s = 0. The relative key rate of BB84 is recovered at
δ = 1.323. Determining the exact value of δ and ways to
decrease it is left for future research.
FIG. 5: Relative key rate as a function of the yet unknown
factor δ by which the scheme changes the QBER. The solid
line represents our protocol with U2 = C(c
∗). The dashed
blue line shows the rate for a maximally improving gate, i.e.,
one which hides all information sent via the quantum channel
(s = 0). The dotted red line shows the rate for BB84. The
QBER in BB84 is fixed to 6%.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Our results show that entanglement can be employed
to considerably improve the BB84-type key distribution,
even in the case of two-qubit entanglement. The new
protocol can be directly adapted to the several variants
of BB84. We have demonstrated one promising scheme,
where an IR eavesdropper must intercept every qubit in
the entangled group to gain any information. Unfortu-
nately, loss of qubits may pose a problem not only for
Eve, but also for Bob. If one of the entangled qubits
is completely lost, the QBER of the remaining qubits
is likely to increase. Therefore, this protocol cannot be
recommended for use at extreme distances where most
transmitted qubits are lost [40]. Making the protocol
robust against qubit loss is a goal for future research.
Since the dimension of the total Hilbert space increases
exponentially with the number of qubits, and the dimen-
sion of the subspace Eve can directly access increases only
linearly, our scheme is expected to show even more pro-
nounced benefits if applied to many-qubit entanglement.
Further optimization for an arbitrary number of entan-
gled qubits and assessment of more potential attacks is
to be carried out in the future. Potential future research
also includes methods for distinguishing between inno-
cent noise in the quantum channel and that caused by
eavesdropping, and determining the exact dependence of
QBER on the innocent noise. The latter would enable
definitive evaluation of the protocol final bit rate.
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APPENDIX
We show that the gate U⋆N defined in Sec. III re-
stricts the information provided by an intercept-resend
attack to at most 1/(2N). First, note that σy |aj ;αj〉 =
|a¯j ;αj〉 for j = 1, ..., N . We claim that single-
qubit measurements in any basis, applied to state
U⋆N (|a1;α1〉|a2;α2〉 · · · |aN ;αN 〉), give uniformly random
results until the last, Nth, one. Thus it is not until the
last measurement that Eve gets any information with the
IR attack. Let us refer to this randomness of the first
N − 1 measurements as property R.
To prove this first claim, we note that the trans-
mitted states for gates U⋆2,even and U
⋆
2,odd are, re-
spectively, (|a1;α1〉|a2;α2〉 ± i|a¯1;α1〉|a¯2;α2〉) /
√
2 and
(|a1;α1〉|a¯2;α2〉 ± i|a¯1;α1〉|a2;α2〉) /
√
2, on which the
6first single-qubit measurement, in any basis, gives a uni-
formly random result. Hence, gates U⋆2,even and U
⋆
2,odd
have property R.
We write
U⋆N,P =
1√
2N−1
2N−1∑
l=1
ulN,P , (A1)
where the parity P is even or odd, and ulN,P is a unique
tensor product of operators I1 and σy, with an even or
odd number of operators σy according to the parity P .
The parity is invariant under the application of Eq. (2).
As the total number of different N -qubit tensor products
of I1 and σy is 2
N and half of them have an even number
of operators σy, the sum in Eq. (A1) contains all possible
ulN,P of the given parity P . It follows that any permu-
tation of qubits in the state U⋆N,P (|a1;α1〉 · · · |aN ;αN 〉)
results in essentially the same state, i.e., only the phases
of the different terms change, which has not effect on the
outcome of the following measurement. Hence, we can
assume that the leftmost qubit is measured first, with-
out restricting Eve’s actual order of measurements. Thus
the application of the gate U⋆N is not limited to IR attack,
for which the measurement order of the eavesdropper is
determined by Alice.
According to Eq. (2), the outcome of measuring the
leftmost qubit in the state U⋆N,P (|a1;α1〉 · · · |aN ;αN 〉) is
uniformly random. Moreover, a correct result leads to
the remaining state to be that resulting from application
of gate U⋆N−1,P , i.e., the gate of the same parity. An
incorrect result leads to the state corresponding to U⋆N−1
of different parity. Thus, gate U⋆N has property R for all
N > 1. As Eve measures the qubits, she unwinds the
recursion of Eq. (2) through even and odd states while
learning nothing of the key until the remaining state has
N = 1.
Let E1 and EN denote the random variables of the
outcomes of the first N − 1 measurements and the final,
Nth measurement Eve makes, respectively. Denote the
conditional entropy of EN as hN = H(EN |A,E1). Note
that 0 ≤ hN ≤ 1. If U⋆N is used, I(A,E1) = 0. The en-
tropy H(E1) = N−1. Using the definition of conditional
entropy H(X |Y ) = H(X,Y )−H(Y ), we obtain
I(A,E) =
1
N
[2N −H(A,E1, EN )]
=
1
N
[2N − hN −H(E1|A)−H(A)]
=
1
N
[N − hN −H(E1)]
=
1
N
(1− hN ) , (A2)
where we have recomposed random variables as
I(A,E) = I(A,E1, EN ) = I(AE1, EN ). Since the last
measurement targets one qubit in a BB84 state, hN =
1
2
and I(A,E) = 12N . This completes our proof that the
gate U⋆N limits the information provided by an intercept-
resend attack to at most 1/(2N) per bit.
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